PROTECTING VIRGINIA'S YOUTH:
ESTABLISHING A CHILDREN'S OMBUDSMAN OFFICE

Chelsea Dunn*
I. INTRODUCTION

Efforts from across Virginia to give our Commonwealth's vulnerable
children a voice culminated on March 8, 2008, as legislation approving
the creation of a Children's Ombudsman Office passed both houses of
the Virginia legislature.1 Senate Bill 315, introduced by Senator John S.
Edwards 2 and co-sponsored by Senator R. Edward Houck,' passed the
Senate with only one dissenting vote and received unanimous treatment
in the House.4 House Bill 1131, introduced by Delegate William H.
Fralin, Jr. 5 and co-sponsored by Delegate Robert H. Brink, 6 was
approved unanimously in both chambers. 7 These identical bills seek to
give a voice to the 9,269 vulnerable children in the custody of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. 8 As originally introduced, the legislation
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Richmond: T.C. Williams School of Law; B.S. & B.A., 2006,
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1. Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: HBili31, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=HB1131; Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: SB
315, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=08i&typ=bil&val=SB315; see also
H.B. 1131, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008), 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (as passed Feb. 28, 2008 by the
House and Senate); S.B. 315, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008), 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (as passed
Mar. 5, 2008 by the House and Senate).
2. John S. Edwards is the Democratic Senator for Virginia's 21st District.
3. R. Edward Houck is the Democratic Senator for Virginia's 17th District.
4. Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: SB 315, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=SB315.
5. William H. Fralin, Jr. is the Republican Delegate for Virginia's 17th District.
6. Robert H. Brink is the Democratic Delegate for Virginia's 48th District.
7. Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: HBili31, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=081 &typ=bil&val=HBI 131.
8. This figure represents the number of children in Virginia's foster care system as well as those in
state juvenile correctional facilities. The Department of Social Services reports that 8,173 children
were served in foster care in 2007. VA. DEP'T OF SOC. SERvs., 2008 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT
22 (2008), available at http://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/aboutlreports/agency wide/annual statistical/
2008_online vers.pdf. Statistical information from the Department of Juvenile Justice indicates that a
total of 1,096 children were held in juvenile correctional centers in 2007. VA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE,
FY 2007 STATISTICAL
INFORMATION 2 (2008), available at http://www.
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created an Office of the Children's Ombudsman as an independent office
under the Governor of Virginia that would be implemented over a threeyear period to defray costs. 9 Amendments to these bills, however,
prevent implementation unless the General Assembly is able to allocate
funds in this year's budget. 10
Though well-intentioned, the actions of the General Assembly are
meaningless without a budget amendment.
Even if the Office of the
Children's Ombudsman fails to receive funds and is never codified, the
strong coalition of supporters advocating for this bill will likely ensure
the issue is revisited in the 2009 General Assembly session. Actual
implementation will require initiating new legislation-fortunately, this
year's success will give future bills a strong foundation upon which to
stand. Legislators and advocates alike should recognize the need for this
legislation and understand the features necessary to create an effective
ombudsman office. This comment will discuss the attributes of an ideal
ombudsman office, describe the background and substantive content of
Virginia's Children's Ombudsman bills, and suggest improvements to the
legislation.
II. THE FOUR CORNERSTONES

OF AN EFFECTIVE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE

"Ombudsman" is a term borrowed from the Swedish language1 2 that
has become commonly used in the United States to describe various
types of complaint-handlers or problem-solvers. 1 3 Ombudsman offices

d j.virginia.gov/AboutUs/AdministrativeUnits/Research and Evaluation Unit/pdf/DJJ
-Statistics FY2007.pdf. This figure does not include the 17,696 children admitted to local detention
facilities during 2007. Id.
9. See H.B. 1131, 2 (as introduced Jan. 8, 2008); S.B. 315, 2 (as introduced Jan. 8, 2008).
10. H.B. 1131, 4 (as passed Feb. 28, 2008 by the House and Senate); S.B. 315, 4 (as passed Mar. 8,
2008 by the House and Senate). The Senate Finance Committee added an enactment clause to Senate
Bill 315 while the House Appropriations Committee added identical language to House Bill 1131. See
Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: SB 315, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=SB315; Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking:
HB1131, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=HB 1131.
11. See H.B. 1131, 4 (as passed Feb. 28, 2008 by the House and Senate); S.B. 315, 4 (as passed
Mar. 8, 2008 by the House and Senate).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
BULLETIN:
STATE
OMBUDSMAN
PROGRAMS
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/204607.pdf [hereinafter OJJDP, BULLETIN] ("'Ombudsman' is
derived from the Swedish word meaning agent or representative.").
13. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Children's Ombudsman Offices (2008), http://www.
ncsl.org/programs/cyf/ ombuds.htm [hereinafter NCSL, Offices]; U.S. OMBUDSMAN ASS'N,
GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS 1 (2003), http://www. usombudsman.orgdocuments/
PDF/References/USOASTANDARDS.pdf [hereinafter U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS].
JUSTICE
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have been established in both the public and private sectors, including
federal, state, and local administrative settings; academia; and business
contexts. 14 A governmental ombudsman is defined by the United States
Ombudsman Association as "an independent, impartial public official
with authority and responsibility to receive, investigate or informally
address complaints about government actions, and, when appropriate,
' 15
make findings and recommendations, and publish reports.
Generally, a children's ombudsman office, sometimes entitled a
children's advocate office, protects both the individual and system-wide
rights of children by providing oversight of agencies serving youth and
families. 16 A children's ombudsman "provides a voice for children's
interests and acts as a watchdog to ensure that those interests are
protected. 1 7 These offices receive and investigate complaints from
citizens and families related to harmful action-or inaction-by the
government which adversely affects the welfare or rights of children in
state custody. 8 This investigatory power may include both the right to
14. See STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES 1 (2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/115.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
15. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 1.
16. See NCSL, Offices, supranote 13.
17. Gary B. Melton, Lessons from Norway: The Children's Ombudsman as a Voice for Children, 23
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 197, 202 (1991). In 1981, Norway was the first nation to adopt an
ombudsman for children. Id. at 201. This advocacy position was established to "serve[] as a
representative for children in policymaking and a guardian in policy implementation." Id. at 202.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
CHALLENGE ACTIVITIES PROGRAM: CHALLENGE ACTIVITY F 1 (1996), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles

/chalprof.pdf [hereinafter OJJDP, CHALLENGE]. The American Bar Association's Model Ombudsman
statute, adopted by resolution in 1969 and amended in 1971 recommends twelve criteria for
ombudsman statutes. Bernard Frank, State Ombudsman Legislation in the United States, 29 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 397, 399-400 (1975). The twelve elements were not only suggested, but considered essential
to guarantee fairness and legitimacy in the ombudsman's oversight function. Id. at 400. These
characteristics include:
(1) authority of the ombudsman to criticize all agencies, officials, and public employees
except courts and their personnel, legislative bodies and their personnel, and the chief
executive and his personal staff; (2) independence of the ombudsman from control by
any other officer, except for his responsibility to the legislative body; (3) appointment
by the legislative body or appointment by the executive with confirmation by a
designated proportion of the legislative body, preferably more than a majority, such as
two-thirds; (4) independence of the ombudsman through a long term, not less than five
years, with freedom from removal except for cause, determined by more than a
majority of the legislative body, such as two-thirds; (5) a high salary equivalent to that
of a designated top officer; (6) freedom of the ombudsman to employ his own assistants
and to delegate to them, without restraints of civil service and classification acts; (7)
freedom of the ombudsman to investigate any act or failure to act by any agency,
official, or public employee; (8) access of the ombudsman to all public records he finds
relevant to an investigation; (9) authority to inquire into fairness, correctness of
findings, motivation, adequacy of reasons, efficiency, and procedural propriety of any
action or inaction by any agency, official, or public employee; (10) discretionary
power to determine what complaints to investigate and to determine what criticisms to
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inspect residential facilities on either a routine or unannounced basis and
access to the agencies' records and documents. 19 Often, these offices
also have the opportunity to recommend systemic improvements in
annual reports to government officials, state legislatures, and the
public.20

Existing children's ombudsman structures are designed in a variety of
different manners. 21 Of those established within the government, some
are independent external offices 22 while others are implemented
internally, within child-serving agencies themselves. 23 In some states,
an ombudsman is established to oversee all state agencies and thus has
authority over child-serving agencies as well. 24 Any ombudsman office,

make or to publicize; (11) opportunity for any agency, official, or public employee
criticized by the ombudsman to have advance notice of the criticism and to publish with
the criticism an answering statement; (12) immunity of the ombudsman and his staff
from civil liability on account of official action.
Id.
19. See Frank, supranote 18, at 420-21; see also NSCL, Offices, supranote 13.
20. Frank, supranote 18, at 434; NSCL, Offices, supranote 13.
21. See OJJDP, BULLETIN, supra note 12, at 4-6.
22. The states with independent children's ombudsman offices include Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Washington. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-13k (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §9001A (2003);
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-170 (2008); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/35.5 (2008) (establishing an Office of
the Inspector General for Children and Family Services, which is located within, but independent to,
the Department of Children and Family Services and reports to the Governor and legislature); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4087-A (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 6-402 (LexisNexis
2008) (establishing a juvenile justice monitoring unit under the Attorney General); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.923 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 257.0762 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27EE-67 (West 2001); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-73-5 (2006), S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-5210 to -5220 (2007) (creating a Children's
Case Resolution System within the Governor's Office of Children's Affairs, which provides
ombudsman services to children and families); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-3-103 (Supp. 2007)
(establishing a Commission on Children and Youth, which includes an Ombudsman Office); WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.06A.010 (2008).
23. California, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia are among the
states that have established ombudsman offices serving children within various state agencies. See,
e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16161 (West 2007) (establishing a foster care ombudsman within the
Department of Social Services); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-A:4(III) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §
7302-3.2 (2007) (establishing an Office of the Advocate Defender within the Department of Juvenile
Justice); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-208 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 66-3.1 (2007) (creating the
position of Inspector General within the Department of Social Services); 920 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:030
(2007) (setting forth the duties of the Office of the Ombudsman established within the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 340:2-3-1 to 2-3-22 (2006) (establishing an
Office of Client Advocacy within the Department of Human Services); see also OJJDP, BULLETIN,
supra note 12, at 12 (describing Kentucky's Office of the Juvenile Justice Ombudsman established
within the state's Department of Juvenile Justice); Missouri Dep't of Soc. Servs., State Technical
Assistance Team, http://www.dss.mo.gov/statlindex.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) (describing the
mission of the State Technical Assistance Team within the Missouri Department of Social Services).
24. These states include Alaska, Arizona, Florida, and Nebraska. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
24.55.100 (Supp. 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1371, 1376(A)(1) (2004); FLA. STAT. § 402.164
(Supp. 2008) (establishing a legislative council comprised of volunteers to investigate state agency
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whether it serves the public or private sector, adults or children, requires
four elements for effectiveness: (1) independence, (2) impartiality, (3)
25
confidentiality, and (4) legitimacy.
A. Independence: The Core Defining Principle of an Ombudsman
An ombudsman and his employees must be free from any external
control or influence. 26 The office must not have cause to fear
retribution from agencies or complainants when pursuing investigations,
publicizing findings, and making recommendations. 27 The independence
of an office should be assessed using two factors: (1) whether anyone can
control or limit the ombudsman's performance of assigned duties, and
(2) whether anyone can eliminate the office or the officer or reduce
28
funding.
Ombudsman offices established within agencies themselves cause
concern because the ombudsman is beholden to the agency being
scrutinized; thus, reports and findings may not be totally unbiased and
are not as well-trusted by the public. 29 Ideally, an ombudsman should be
established by law, either constitutionally or legislatively, and appointed
by the legislature or executive.30
Many other indicators of independence exist. An ombudsman should
only be removed from office for just cause, using a fair procedure. 3 1 A
longer term of office is more desirable, as it allows the ombudsman to
become more proficient at his position while freeing him from political

actions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,240 (creating a Public Counsel Office, appointed by the legislature
to oversee the administrative actions of all state agencies).
25. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 3-4; U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 1.

26. ABA STANDARDS, supranote 14, at 3.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 2 ("The less independent Ombudsman will

be suspect as unable to conduct a thorough and critical investigation by various clients from the outset
and vulnerable to retaliation or lasting animosity if aggressive inquiry is, indeed, carried out.").
30. Legislative appointment is generally favored. See id.; see also U.S. OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, MODEL
OMBUDSMAN
ACT
FOR
STATE
GOVERNMENTS
§
5
(1997),
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/usoamodell.html [hereinafter U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL
STATUTE]; Frank, supranote 18, at 409.
31. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 5; U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 3; see also
U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 8; Frank, supra note 18, at 415 ("The ABA
Model Statute adopts the principle that the independence of the Ombudsman is maintained by freeing
him from removal from office except for cause determined by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature ...
• This protects the Ombudsman from removal by the Governor in the event the Governor objects to
the ombudsman's activities").

46

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. 12:41

considerations, as his term will outlast that of his appointer. 32 The
ombudsman should also have discretion to select what matters are
appropriate
for investigation, initiate necessary investigations,
determine recommendations and conclusions, and make publication
decisions. 33 The findings of the ombudsman's office should not be
appealable to any other authority. 34 Lastly, the ombudsman should be
immune against civil and criminal claims arising out of the lawful
35
performance of duty.
B. Impartiality: The Heart of an Ombudsman Office
An ombudsman must be unencumbered by bias and conflicts of
interest. 36
Without impartiality, the public will neither trust the
ombudsman's office nor seek its assistance, and agencies will resist both
investigation and criticism. 37 Once public confidence is compromised,
38
the entire purpose of an ombudsman office becomes moot.
All indicators of impartiality must be present in order to maintain the
utmost credibility and secure the effectiveness of the ombudsman
office. 39 Any statute establishing an ombudsman's office should set
forth certain qualifications required of the ombudsman, including
objectivity; good judgment; integrity; and the ability to deal with
problems of law, administration, and public policy. 40
Neither an
ombudsman nor his employees can be a candidate for any other public
office-in fact, there should not be any involvement in partisan or
political activities. 41 Additionally, the ombudsman should not serve in
any other occupation, profession, or business relationship that may
result in a conflict of interest. 42 The ombudsman must also take care to
remove himself from any complaint investigations where even an
32. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 7; Frank, supra note 18, at 413.
33. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 4.
34. See id. at 5 ("This ideal principle sets the Ombudsman apart from routine administrative process
and supports the Ombudsman's role as an impartial critic and opinion giver."); see also U.S.
OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 17(a); Frank, supra note 18, at 439.
35. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 5; see also U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE,
supranote 30, at § 17(b); Frank, supranote 18, at 439.
36. ABA, STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 5.
37. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 5.

38. See id.
39. See id.; Frank, supranote 18, at 410-11.
40. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 6(a); Frank, supranote 18, at 410.
41. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 6(b)(1)-(2); U.S. OMBUDSMAN,
STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 5-6; Frank, supra note 18, at 410.
42. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 6(b)(3); U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS,
supranote 13, at 5; Frank, supranote 18, at 410.
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appearance of a conflict of interest may exist. 43 Furthermore, an
ombudsman must not let personal views interfere with investigatory
44
decisions, complaint resolutions, or recommendations.
C. Confidentiality: The Sword and Shield of the Ombudsman
The records to which an ombudsman has access must be as
confidential as they were prior to the investigation. 45 Thus, an agency's
confidential records cannot be revealed merely because they were subject
to an investigation; these records cannot be disclosed outside of the
ombudsman's office. 46 The ombudsman, however, may use a promise of
confidentiality as a tool to collect needed information. 47
These
guarantees of protection, however, cannot exceed the ombudsman's
ability to keep information from disclosure. 48 Once the ombudsman
promises confidentiality, he must deliver it. 49 Even without a promise
of non-disclosure, "[t]he Ombudsman should not release information
where confidentiality is required by law, or where unnecessary harm
'50
would result.
Legislation creating ombudsman offices must be careful to mandate
that the ombudsman will never be compelled to testify or release
records. 51 Such a provision will allow the ombudsman to exercise

control over the information collected and reduce agency resistance to
52
investigation.
This confidentiality requirement, however, should not be interpreted
to prohibit the ombudsman from notifying the agency of the
complaint. 5 3 The decision to give notice of an allegation should be
43. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 6.
44. See id. ("It is important that the Ombudsman be aware of his or her personal views and guard
against letting those views influence whether or not a complaint will be accepted and how it will be
treated.").
45. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 7; see ABA, STANDARDS, supranote 14, at 4.
46. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 4.
47. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 7.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 17(c); U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS,
supranote 13, at 7; see also Frank, supranote 18, at 426.
52. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 8.

An agency should not be exposed to

liability for releasing records in furtherance of an investigation. Cf.id. at 7 (explaining that when the
ombudsman receives information the law prohibits being made public, "the Ombudsman must treat
[that] information with the same degree of confidentiality as would be legally required of the agency
being investigated.").
53. See Frank, supranote 18, at 432.
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discretionary. 54 Additionally, the ombudsman should always inform the
complainant of any investigatory decisions, in addition to the
investigatory process.5 5 These notifications will give credibility to the
investigatory process.
D. Legitimacy: The Means of Securing Public Confidence
The concept of legitimacy encompasses two different elements: a
credible review process and transparency in investigations.5 6 Together,
these two elements represent the ombudsman's responsibility to the
public. 57 Like independence, impartiality, and confidentiality, the
element of legitimacy will instill the public with trust that complaints
58
will be investigated and resolved fairly.
A number of factors must be present to create a credible review
process. The ombudsman should possess the qualifications and expertise
necessary to properly fulfill his role. 59 Additionally, the ombudsman's
office should have the discretion to resolve a complaint informally, if
formal action would not be appropriate. 60 Informal resolution may
include referral, information-giving, and mediation. 61 Providing the
ombudsman discretion to determine whether informal action would be
sufficient will allow the office to maximize its resources for those
complaints requiring investigation. 62 Another important indicator of a
credible review process is accessibility-an ombudsman's office loses its
value if it is not well-publicized and readily accessible. 63 Additionally,
the jurisdiction and powers of the ombudsman office should be defined
clearly, and employees must be careful not to exceed the scope of any
limitations imposed by the enacting statute. 64 Lastly, the ombudsman
54. Id.
55. See id. at 430.
56. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 8; Frank, supra note 18, at 431 (noting the
importance of keeping the complainant informed).
57. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 8.
58. See id. at 2.
59. See id. at 8.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also US OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 12(b)(1); Frank, supra note 8,
at 427 (noting that the Ombudsman is not a substitute for agency's internal complaint procedures, and
that citizens may be given information on the procedural steps of another remedy).
62. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 8.
63. Id. at 9. No fee may be imposed for access to the Ombudsman's services. Id.; see also U.S.
OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 11 (i); Frank, supra note 18, at 420.
64. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 9. In addition, certain limitations should be
imposed on an Ombudsman's powers, such as restrictions on the ability to:
(1) make, change, or set aside a law, policy, or administrative decision; (2) make
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65
must have sufficient powers to conduct thorough investigations.

An ombudsman office can guarantee transparency by implementing a
clearly defined complaint procedure available to the public. 66 If the
ombudsman declines to investigate a complaint, he should give the
complainant an explanation. 67
The ombudsman should also keep
complainants and agencies apprised of the status and results of an
investigation. 68
Before publicizing adverse findings, however, the
ombudsman must consult with the involved agency, give the agency

reasonable time to reply, and include the agency's statement in its
publicized findings. 69 The final means by which transparency can be
achieved is through regular activity reports from the ombudsman office
70
to the public, legislature, and Governor.
III.

VIRGINIA'S LEGISLATION:

A

STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

The existence of the four essential elements-independence,
impartiality, confidentiality, and legitimacy-are vital to securing public

trust. Virginia's legislation was a well-drafted effort to encompass these
key qualities and, with the proper funding, would create an effective and
successful children's ombudsman office. There are, however, a few
improvements that would make Virginia's Office of the Children's
binding decisions or determine rights; (3) directly compel an entity or any person to
implement the ombud's recommendations; (4) conduct an investigation that substitutes
for administrative or judicial proceedings; (5) accept jurisdiction over an issue that is
currently pending in a legal forum unless all parties and the presiding officer in that
action explicitly consent; (6) address any issue arising under a collective bargaining
agreement or which falls within the purview of any federal, state, or local labor or
employment law, rule or regulation ... ; or (7) act in a manner inconsistent with the
grant of and limitations on the jurisdiction of the office when discharging the duties of
the office of ombuds.").
ABA, STANDARDS, supranote 14, at 4.
65. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 10. These powers will ideally include the ability
to examine the records and documents of any agency within the office's jurisdiction, enter and inspect
any agency's premises without notice, subpoena both persons and records, and obtain any information
required for the discharge of duty. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at §11(c)-(f);
Frank, supranote 18, at 420-21.
66. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 11.

Guidelines of the investigation process

and the criteria for dismissing complaints should also be made available. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. As the investigation proceeds, this may be done only upon the complainant's request, but once
the investigation is completed, findings and recommendations should be disclosed to all parties. See
U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at §§ 13-14; Frank, supra note 18, at 430-33.
69. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 10-11; see U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE,

supranote 30, at §14; Frank, supranote 18, at 432.
70. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 10; see also U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE,
supranote 30, at §16; Frank, supranote 18, at 437-38.
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Ombudsman consistent with an ideal ombudsman office.
In 2006, Senator Edwards submitted Senate Bill 208, which first
introduced the Virginia General Assembly to the concept of a children's
ombudsman office.7 1 The Senate Committee on General Laws and
Technology heard the bill, and committee members unanimously agreed
that the impact of establishing such an office should be studied by the
Commission on Youth.7 2 Following a two-year study, the Commission
on Youth adopted the study's recommendation to introduce legislation
in the 2008 session of the General Assembly proposing the creation of a
children's ombudsman office. 73 The Commission's report recognized
the importance of the four basic principles underlying the concept of an
ombudsman program, as well as the twelve essential characteristics set
forth by the American Bar Association (ABA). 74 The efforts of the
Commission staff to carefully research and analyze the features crucial
to the position of ombudsman resulted in two identical bills that closely
comply with the standards espoused by the ABA and the U.S.
75
Ombudsman Association.
A. Independence: Nearly There
Senate Bill 3 15 and House Bill 113 1 sought to create the Office of the
Children's Ombudsman within the Office of the Governor. 76 According
to the terms of this legislation, the ombudsman is appointed by the
Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly, and can
only be removed for cause. 77 The term of the ombudsman shall be four

71. VA. COMM'N ON YOUTH, ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHILDREN'S OMBUDSMAN OFFICE: INTERIM
REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON YOUTH, REP. DOc. NO. 81 at 1 (2007), available at
http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/RD812007/$file/RD81.pdf [hereinafter VA. COMM'N,
ESTABLISHMENT].

72. Id.
73. VA. COMM'N ON YOUTH, 2007 LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND INITIATIVES at 4 (Recommendations
adopted Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://coy.state.va.us/120507o20Approvedo20Recommendations
.pdf.
74. VA. COMM'N, ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 71, at 17-19; see supra note 18.
75. See H.B. 1131 (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008). See
generally U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13 (categorizing the standards as independence,
impartiality, confidentiality, and credible review process); Frank, supra note 18, at 400 (outlining
qualities that any statute creating an Ombudsman should contain).
76. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008).
77. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008). The bills only allow the Governor to remove the ombudsman for
cause in accordance with Virginia Code section 2.2-108. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as
Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008). This statute
permits removal for "malfeasance, misfeasance, incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty,
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years, except for the term of initial appointment, which will expire one
year after the end of the appointing governor's term of office.78 The
office may decline to investigate complaints determined to be frivolous
79
or made in bad faith.
The location of the Office of the Children's Ombudsman within the
Governor's Office would secure its independence from the agencies it
scrutinizes.8 0
Though appointment by the legislature is favored,
appointment by the executive still indicates independence, so long as the
Governor's choice is confirmed by the legislature. 1 While removal by
the Governor does cause some concern, this provision does contain a
limiting clause that will only allow removal in very specific
circumstances, preventing abuse and bias.8 2 The four-year term length
and the possibility of re-appointment should give time for the
ombudsman to gain expertise, and the provision changing the expiration
of the initial term of appointment will eliminate political concerns. 3
The Virginia legislation also gives the ombudsman discretion to choose
what complaints to investigate, another characteristic indicating
4
independence.
Two important indicators of independence, however, are absent:
appealability and immunity. 5
In order to guarantee complete
independence of the children's ombudsman, the findings of the office

absenteeism, conflict of interests, failure to carry out the policies of the Commonwealth as established
in the Constitution or by the General Assembly, or refusal to carry out a lawful directive of the
Governor." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-108 (2008).
78. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(B) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(B)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2008).
79. H.B. 1131,
1, § 2.2-214.3(A)(2) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315,
1, § 2.2214.3(A)(2) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2008).
80. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; see also H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted
as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2008).
81. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 5; U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra
note 13, at 2; Frank, supranote 18, at 409; see H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Act of Mar.
7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Actof Mar. 27, 2008).
82. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(A)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2008); Frank, supranote 18, at 414; see supranote 73.
83. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.2(B) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.2(B)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008); see U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 7;
Frank, supranote 18, at 413.
84. H.B. 1131,
1, § 2.2-214.3(A)(2) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315,
1, § 2.2214.3(A)(2) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008); see U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at
4.
85. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 5; see also U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE,
supra note 30, at § 17 (describing the basis for ombudsman immunity); Frank, supra note 18, at 439
(discussing the lack of an appeal for an ombudsman's decision and the immunity from liability).
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should be free from appeal to any other authority. 86 Further, the
ombudsman and his employees should be immune from legal liability for
87
any conduct in the course of duty absent serious misconduct.
B. Impartiality: Mission Not Yet Accomplished
Although Virginia's Office of the Children's Ombudsman could
function as an objective and unbiased entity, no statutory provisions in
Senate Bill 315 and House Bill 113 1 guarantee impartiality.88
The
legislation should include a clause setting forth qualifications required of
the ombudsman, as well as a clause preventing the ombudsman from
taking part in partisan political activities or holding any public office.8 9
The other indicators of impartiality rely on the integrity of the
ombudsman himself. In practice, the children's ombudsman must excuse

himself from any investigation that might present even the slightest
appearance of a conflict of interest. 90 He must also not let his personal
views interfere with the performance of his duties. 91 This level of
integrity could be statutorily guaranteed with the inclusion of a
qualifications clause.
C. Confidentiality: A Sword But No Shield
Virginia's legislation grants the children's ombudsman access to all
information, even confidential information, necessary for full
investigation. 92
The bills also require the maintenance of
confidentiality. 93 Consequently, the ombudsman is liable to disclosure

86. Because the findings and recommendations of the ombudsman are not binding, there is no danger
in preventing appeal of these actions. Instead, inappealability sustains the role of the ombudsman as a
critic and protects these findings from modification by any other entity. U.S. OMBUDSMAN,
STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 5.
87. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 17 ("As a public watchdog, the
Ombudsman should be able to state his or her position freely and candidly without fear of pressure or
reprisal.").
88. See H.B. 1131 (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008).
89. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for a list of the qualifications and a discussion of
the ideal requirements of impartiality. The ombudsman should also refrain from participation in any
business relationship that might prevent a conflict of interests. See supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
90. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 6.
91. Id.
92. H.B. 1131,
1, § 2.2-214.3(A)(5) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315,
1, § 2.2214.3(A)(5) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008).
93. H.B. 1131,
1, § 2.2-214.3(A)(5) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315,
1, § 2.2214.3(A)(5) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008) ("All information obtained shall be maintained by the
Ombudsman as confidential in the same manner as is required by the agency or entity from which it
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94
penalties to the same extent as the information's source.

Though this mandate of confidentiality will protect the subjects of an
investigation from being held liable for releasing information to the
ombudsman, no parallel provision protects the ombudsman office. 95
Ideally, the legislation should incorporate a provision that would prevent
the ombudsman from being compelled to release records or testify about
96
any information collected in the course of an investigation.
D. Legitimacy: More Transparency Needed
Virginia's legislation vests a broad grant of power in the Office of the
Children's Ombudsman. 97 These powers would provide the children's
ombudsman with almost all the tools necessary to conduct thorough and
accurate investigations, an important characteristic of a credible review
process. 98 The information-giving and referral power will allow the
children's ombudsman to resolve complaints informally when
appropriate, another indicator of a credible review process. 99
One vital tool excluded from Virginia's legislation is the ability to
subpoena persons and documents. The ability to subpoena documents
from agencies would greatly facilitate the success of a children's
ombudsman's office and ensure investigations are complete. 100
In
practice, this power would not be used in an adversarial manner, but
rather to protect child-serving agencies from the liability associated with
releasing records to a third party. It would also be advantageous for the
enacting statute to mandate the office to publicize itself and prohibit the

was obtained.").
94. H.B. 1131,
1, § 2.2-214.3(A)(5) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315,
214.3(A)(5) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2008).

1,

§ 2.2-

95. See H.B. 1131 (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008).
96. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at § 17(c); Frank, supra note 18, at 439.
97. See H.B. 1131, 1, §§ 2.2-214.2(A), -214.3(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, §§
2.2-214.2(A), -214.3(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008). These powers include the power to
receive & investigate complaints, conduct announced or unannounced inspections of any residential
facility in which a child has been placed, make inquiries and obtain all assistance and information

necessary to investigate complaints, enter into an agreement with a state agency to ensure the
protection of children, notify law enforcement of any violation of law, report problems to the head of
the involved agency, and serve as a source of information and referrals for the public, as well as the
power to adopt policies and guidelines to carry out the provisions of this section. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-

214.3(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, ' 1, § 2.2-214.3(A) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,
2008).
98. See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
99. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 8.

100. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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levying of fees for use of the ombudsman's services. 10 1
House Bill 1131 and Senate Bill 315 also require the Office of the
Children's Ombudsman to submit reports to the Governor, General
Assembly, and Commission on Youth on its activities, findings, and

recommendations. 10 2
These reports are an essential feature of
transparency, but are not the only necessary indicator of transparent
investigations.10 3 The Office of the Children's Ombudsman should also
be required to make public the guidelines of the investigation process and
the criteria for dismissing complaints.10 4 Furthermore, the children's
ombudsman must notify all involved parties about the status of
complaints.1 0 5 Lastly, and most important, the annual reports must also
10 6
be made available to the public.

IV. CONCLUSION

Virginia's Office of the Children's Ombudsman is currently in a very
uncertain position. While approved by the General Assembly and the
Governor, the office cannot be effectively implemented without the
necessary funds. Still, despite the lack of funds, the bills creating a
children's ombudsman office in Virginia have received nearly unanimous
policy approval by the legislature. Given this success, there is hope that
the children's ombudsman office will receive the fiscal support it requires
in future sessions.
The legislation passed this session is a well-intentioned attempt to
embody the four elements essential to any successful ombudsman office.
Although the Office of the Children's Ombudsman, if established under
Senate Bill 315 and House Bill 1131, would have some of the
characteristics of an ideal ombudsman office, it would fall short of
101. An ombudsman office should be readily accessible to the public. Accessibility requires that the
office be well publicized and cost-free. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 9.
102. H.B. 1131, 1, § 2.2-214.4 (enacted as Act of Mar. 7, 2008); S.B. 315, 1, § 2.2-214.4 (enacted
as Act of Mar. 27, 2008).
103. See supra notes 66-67 for a discussion of these other features.
104. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 11.
105. Both complainant and subject should be apprised of an investigation's findings. During the course
of an investigation, complainants should be able to receive, upon request, information about its status.
U.S. OMBUDSMAN, MODEL STATUTE, supra note 30, at §§ 13-14; Frank, supra note 18, at 430-32.
Complainants whose complaints are dismissed should be provided with an explanation. U.S.
OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 11.
106. U.S. OMBUDSMAN, STANDARDS, supra note 13, at 10 ("It can be seen as a duty of the Ombudsman
to make the public aware of investigation results to promote accountability.").
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perfection.
Achieving complete independence, impartiality, confidentiality, and
legitimacy will require a few changes to the legislation. The children's
ombudsman must be immune from legal liability, and the office's
findings must not be subject to appeal. Additionally, a qualifications
clause should be added to the bill, along with a provision prohibiting the
ombudsman from participating in partisan activities. Furthermore, the
legislation should explicitly set forth that the ombudsman office cannot
be compelled to release the information it collects in furtherance of its
investigations or testify about the subject of these records.
The
ombudsman must also be given the power to subpoena records and
persons.
Lastly, the enacting statute should include provisions
mandating promotion of the office and its services, release of reports to
the public, and notification of a complaint's status for all involved
parties. With these changes, and proper funding, the Office of the
Children's Ombudsman will serve as an important step toward ensuring
the safety and well-being of Virginia's youth.

